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N A FAMOUS 1819 lecture entitled “De la liberté des anciens comparée 
à celle des modernes”1 Benjamin Constant distinguished between two kinds of 
liberty: the “liberty of the moderns” and the “liberty of the ancients”. He identi-
fied the former with individual autonomy comprising an array of individual 
rights, such as the right to property, freedom of expression, right to choose one’s 
profession, religious freedom, etc. The “liberty of the ancients,” on the other 
hand, consisted, according to Constant, in “exercising collectively, but directly, 
several parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square, 
over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting 
laws, in pronouncing judgments”2. This liberty made the individual an integral 
member of the political community, but as Constant noted, “if this was what the 
ancients called liberty, they admitted as compatible with this collective freedom 
the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the community…. No 
importance was given to individual independence”3. 
A number of constitutional developments occurred in the years succeeding 
that lecture at the Athénée royal de Paris. New generations of rights were added to 
the traditional list of political and individual liberties including, most notably, so-
cio-economic rights4. The South African Constitution adopted in 19965 was per-
ceived as an archetypical “third-generation” Constitution. Commentators de-
scribed that Constitution as a societal transformative document that “seeks the 
transformation of the society through the construction of a multi-cultural social 
democracy in South Africa”6. The Constitutional Court itself underscored early on 
                                 
1. CONSTANT: Political Writings 309, Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988. 
2. Id. at 311. 
3. Id. 
4. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, 221, 2001. 
5. An interim Constitution had been ratified in 1993. 
6. DENNIS M. DAVIS, Transformation and the Democratic Case for Judicial Review: The 
I
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that this foundational document marked a decisive break from the disgraceful as-
pects of the past and aspired to commit the nation to a brighter future7.  
While these developments more clearly suggest an enrichment of the “liberty 
of the moderns,” this Comment seeks to read the case of Doctors for Life Interna-
tional v. the Speaker of the National Assembly & Others (“Doctors for Life”) as 
rediscovering and reinvigorating the “liberty of the ancients”. While Constant 
pointed out the inadequacy of the “liberty of the ancients” due to the danger of in-
dividuals being fully subjected to the unbridled collective authority, today’s safe-
guards of individual autonomy rein in or, at least, aspire to keep in check potential 
excesses of collective power. The additional challenge with which we are faced 
today is that, in focusing on the “liberty of the moderns,” we do not lose sight of 
the “liberty of the ancients” in the sense of “active and constant participation in 
collective power”. In his book Active Liberty, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ste-
phen Breyer – while “conscious of the importance of modern liberty” – called in-
creased attention to “the combination’s other half”8. Doctors for Life – I will ar-
gue – similarly invites us to reconsider the content of the “liberty of the ancients” 
by recognizing the importance of and enforcing a regime of citizen participation 
in the legislative process. 
This essay proceeds as follows: Part II provides some background to the case 
and highlights certain key arguments. Since the judgment is 198 pages long, an 
excerpt immediately follows at the end of this Comment. Part III sets forth the 
                                 
South African Experience, 5 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 45 (2007). 
7. See, e.g., S v. T Makwanyane & M Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (S. Afr.) at para. 262 
(Mahomed J, concurring) (noting that the South African Constitution “retains from the past on-
ly what is defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part 
of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive and a vigorous 
identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally 
egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the Constitution…. What the Constitution expressly 
aspires to do is to provide a transition from these grossly unacceptable features of the past to a 
conspicuously contrasting ‘future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and 
peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of 
colour, race, class, belief or sex.’”) (emphasis added). 
8. See STEPHEN BREYER, Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, 3-5, 
2005. See, also, PIERRE ROSANVALLON, Book Review: Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Demo-
cratic Constitution, 5 Int'l J. Const. L., 564, 567 (2007) (noting that “modern freedom is of a 
twofold nature. It is, at once, a vindication of individual autonomy … and an acceptance of the 
freedom to participate in collective sovereignty…. By recognizing this essential duality, Breyer 
reveals, perhaps, the greatest argument in favor of giving greater breadth to the active dimen-
sion of liberty in the modern era, thus balancing freedom's dual aspects”). 
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idea of a fourth-generation right, the right to citizen participation in the legislative 
process, as a prong of the “revitalized liberty of the ancients”. Part IV focuses on 
a crucial novelty of Doctors for Life, namely the judicial enforceability of the par-
ticipatory provisions. Part V presents some concluding observations. 
 
II. Doctors for Life: An Overview. 
A. Background of the case and the constitutional complaint. 
According to section 42(1) of the South African Constitution, the legislative 
authority is vested in Parliament, which consists of two Houses: the National As-
sembly and the National Council of Provinces (“NCOP”). These democratic insti-
tutions represent different interests in the lawmaking process. The National As-
sembly represents “the people … to ensure government by the people” (section 
42(3)). The NCOP “represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are 
taken into account in the national sphere of government. It does this mainly by 
participation in the national legislative process and by providing a national forum 
for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces”. The NCOP performs 
functions similar to the National Assembly but from the distinct vantage point of 
the provinces9. Both bodies must therefore act together in making law to ensure 
that the interests they represent are taken into consideration.  
The procedure for bills that affect the provinces gives more weight to the po-
sition of the NCOP than does the constitutional procedure for bills that do not af-
fect the provinces. After a bill has been passed by the National Assembly it is re-
ferred to the NCOP, which can pass the bill, pass it subject to amendment or re-
ject it. If the NCOP and the National Assembly cannot agree on a bill, it is sent to 
a mediation committee. If the two chambers cannot reach an agreement following 
mediation, the original bill lapses but may still become law if it is passed again 
but now by two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly. In this way, alt-
hough the NCOP does not wield a final veto, it can delay their passage and force a 
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. 
The applicant in this case, Doctors for Life International (“DFL”), chal-
lenged the constitutionality of four pieces of health legislation (“health bills”). 
These bills were: the Sterilisation Amendment Bill; the Traditional Health Practi-
tioners Bill; the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill (“CTOP 
Amendment Act”); and the Dental Technicians Amendment Bill. The CTOP 
                                 
9. As the Court explains, the NCOP shares many of its structural characteristics with the 
German Bundesrat, upon which it was modeled (Doctors for Life, at para. 80). 
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Amendment Act made provision for registered nurses, other than midwives, to 
perform termination of pregnancies at certain public and private facilities, and 
raised questions of the most intense concern for the petitioners. The applicant’s 
complaint alleged that the NCOP, in passing these bills, failed to invite written 
submissions and conduct public hearings as required by its duty to facilitate pub-
lic involvement in its legislative processes and those of its committees. Hence, the 
NCOP and the provincial legislatures did not comply with their constitutional ob-
ligations to facilitate public involvement in their legislative processes as required 
by the provisions of sections 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a) of the Constitution, respec-
tively. In terms of section 72(1)(a), the NCOP “must … facilitate public involve-
ment in [its] legislative and other processes … and [those of] its committees”. 
Section 118(1)(a) contains a similar provision relating to provincial legislatures. 
 
B. The holding of the Court. 
The Court had to consider four questions: first, whether the Constitutional 
Court is the only court which can hear a matter of this nature; second, whether it 
is competent for the Court to grant declaratory relief in respect of the proceedings 
of Parliament; third, the nature and scope of the constitutional obligation of a le- 
gislative organ of the state to facilitate public involvement in the lawmaking pro- 
cess; and fourth, whether on the facts of the case the NCOP complied with that 
obligation when passing the health legislation under challenge, and, if it did not, 
the consequences of its failure. 
The Constitutional Court held that, under Section 167(4)(e) of the Constitu-
tion10, it is the only court capable of hearing a challenge of this nature because the 
challenge involved a decision on whether Parliament had failed to fulfill a consti-
tutional obligation. As to the second question, the Court concluded that the chal-
lenge to the Sterilisation Amendment Bill must be dismissed while it was under 
consideration by the President, but that it had the jurisdiction to consider the con-
stitutional challenge to the other three health bills. With respect to the last two 
questions, the majority of the Court found that Parliament had failed to comply 
with its constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement before passing 
the CTOP Amendment Act and the Traditional Health Practitioners Act as re-
quired by section 72(1)(a) of the Constitution, and declared the two Acts invalid. 
This court order was suspended for a period of 18 months to enable Parliament to 
re-enact the statutes in a manner consistent with the Constitution. This was an 8-3 
                                 
10. Which provides that “[o]nly the Constitutional Court may … e. decide that Parlia-
ment or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation”. 
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decision: Justice Ngcobo wrote the majority opinion which was concurred in by 
Langa CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Nkabinde J and O’Regan. 
J. Sachs J. wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the judgment by 
Ngcobo J and adding observations on the special meaning that participatory de-
mocracy has come to assume in South Africa. Yacoob J wrote the dissenting opin-
ion which was concurred in by Skweyiya J, and van der Westhuizen J wrote a 
judgment explaining why he agreed with the dissent of Yacoob J. 
 
C. The rationale of the Court. 
It was argued in the literature that the seminal value of this case lies in the 
three bases of the court’s approach to the role of legislatures in promoting partici-
patory processes: international human rights law, a unique and specific mandatory 
constitutional duty, and a contextual and historical approach to public participa-
tion11. 
The Court examines the right to political participation as a fundamental hu-
man right in international and foreign law. In this context, it makes reference to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the African 
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, and 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The majority opinion finds that in most 
of these international and regional human rights instruments, the right consists of 
at least two elements: a general right to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
and a more specific right to vote and/or to be elected. Similarly, Justice Ngcobo 
writes, a growing number of national Constitutions, in particular those adopted 
since the entry into force of the ICCPR, expressly embrace the principle of partic-
ipatory democracy. The examples he mentions are those of Tanzania, Portugal, 
Colombia and Belarus. 
However, as we already saw, the Court is faced with the duty to interpret a 
specific constitutional provision, Section 72(1)(a), mandating that the NCOP fa-
cilitate public involvement in the legislative process. To understand this mandate, 
the majority opinion offers some context on the history of public participation and 
the nature of the South African constitutional democracy. It explains that the idea 
of allowing the public to participate in the conduct of public affairs is not a new 
concept, as reflected in the traditional ideas of imbizo/lekgotla/bosberaad. This 
                                 
11. KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY / RASHIDA MANJOO, The Right of Public Participation in 
the Law-Making Process and the Role of [the] Legislature in the Promotion of This Right, 19 
Duke J.Comp. & Int'l L., 1, 3 (2008). 
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kind of participatory consultation process was, and still is, used within South Af-
rican communities as a forum to discuss issues affecting the community and is 
both a practical and symbolic part of the democratic processes. It is a form of par-
ticipatory democracy. The understanding of the nature of the country’s constitu-
tional democracy, notes the majority, should also be grounded in the historical 
context of apartheid, a system that excluded the majority of the people from the 
lawmaking process. 
Justice Ngcobo then goes on to suggest that in the overall scheme of the 
Constitution, the representative and participatory elements of the South African 
democracy should not be seen as being in tension with each other. Rather, the 
constitutional framework requires the achievement of a balanced relationship be-
tween these elements. Section 72(1)(a), like section 59(1)(a) and section 
118(1)(a), addresses the vital relationship between representative and participa-
tory elements, which lies at the heart of the legislative function. It imposes a spe-
cial duty on the legislature and pre-supposes that the legislature will have consi- 
derable discretion in determining how best to achieve this balanced relationship. 
The ultimate question for the Court then is whether there has been the degree of 
public involvement that is required by the Constitution. The test is whether the 
legislature acted reasonably in carrying out its duty to facilitate public involve-
ment in its processes. The following factors could be taken into account as espe-
cially relevant in determining reasonableness: (i) the nature of the legislation con-
cerned; (ii) the importance of the legislation; (iii) the intensity of its impact on the 
public. Other relevant factors include practicalities such as time and expense, 
which relate to the efficiency of the law-making process. What is ultimately im-
portant to the Court is that the legislature has taken steps to afford the public a 
reasonable opportunity to participate effectively in the lawmaking process. And 
its conclusion is that the legislature did not afford citizens such an opportunity in 
passing two of the health bills. 
 
III. A fourth-generation right to participation: Participation in policyma- 
king within the legislature. 
Schematically, we could roughly distinguish three types of “participation 
rights” that citizens can exercise vis-à-vis the administration or public authorities 
more generally. This idea builds on Francesca Bignami’s outline of three genera-
tions of participation rights in the European Union12. Section A presents these 
                                 
12. See FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, Three Generations of Participation Rights Before the Eu-
ropean Commission, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 61 (2004). 
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first three generations and suggests that there has been increasing interest recently 
– and rightly so – in the third generation of participatory rights: the right to partic-
ipate in administrative policymaking. However, Doctors for Life might indicate 
the emergence of a fourth generation of participation rights. This new generation 
of rights pertains to parliamentary lawmaking and more interestingly or surpris-
ingly goes back to and revitalizes the “liberty of the ancients” (Section B). 
 
A. The first three generations of participation rights. 
1. The first generation: Right of defense. 
The first generation of participation rights essentially consists in a “right of 
defense”: that is, an individual or a firm has the right to be heard before adverse 
administrative action is taken against it. The idea here is that citizens participate 
in the formation of acts that adversely, but individually, affect them. The value 
served is fairness since this process is a safeguard against arbitrariness: when the 
administration is planning on taking action of direct and individual concern to a 
citizen (e.g., a sanction against them), that citizen should be entitled to take notice 
and make their case before the administration. In a similar vein, certain legal or-
ders provide for mechanisms to review within the administrative apparatus ad-
ministrative acts after their adoption. For instance, in the French system, citizens 
may, under certain conditions, ask the administrative agency who issued an act to 
review its decision (recours gracieux) or resort to a hierarchically superior body 
(recours hiérarchique). What distinguishes the first generation of participation 
rights from the third and the fourth is that these rights only apply to individual 
measures with a direct and personal link to a specific person. They do not apply to 
policymaking – either by an administrative agency or by the Parliament – that af-
fects the population more generally13. 
 
2. The second generation: transparency. 
This is the right of the public to have access to information regarding the 
                                 
13. The European Court of Justice highlighted this distinction in the case Atlanta AG v. 
Council & Commission, Court of Justice of the European Communities Case C-104/97 P, 
Judgment of 14 October 1999. The Court held that no right to be heard prior to the adoption of 
a legislative act (which in this case involved a choice of economic policy) can be deduced from 
the provision of then Article 173(4) of the Treaty. This provision stipulated that any natural or 
legal person may institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a 
decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, 
is of direct and individual concern to the former. 
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policymaking processes and outcomes. It entails the possibility to be physically 
present at the decisionmaking public bodies, e.g., the Parliament, or receive in-
formation about their operations through the press. One of the most important in-
stantiations of this right is the individual right of access to documents14. Although 
the right to transparency is not in itself a right to participation in policymaking, it 
is its necessary precondition laying the ground for the emergence of the third-
generation right of civil society participation in administrative rulemaking.  
In the last two decades there has been what was described as a “global ex-
plosion” of freedom of information laws: while twenty-five years ago only ten na-
tions had laws that specifically guaranteed the rights of citizens to access gov-
ernment information, by October 2005, a total of 66 countries had passed such 
laws15. Different agencies, such as the Commission d'accès aux documents admin-
istratifs in France, the European Ombudsman in the European Union and the Fe- 
deral Institute for Access to Information in Mexico16 (IFAI in Spanish), have tak-
en on the role of promoting and guaranteeing the right to transparency in various 
jurisdictions. 
The South African Constitution is illustrative of the connection between the 
second-generation right to transparency and what we call the fourth-generation 
right to participate in the legislative process. Sections 72(1)(b) and 72(2), which 
immediately follow the key provision of section 72(1)(a) about public involve-
ment in the legislative process, read: “[The National Council of Provinces must] 
b. conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and those of its 
committees, in public, but reasonable measures may be taken - 
i. to regulate public access, including access of the media, to the Council and 
its committees; and 
ii. to provide for the searching of any person and, where appropriate, the re-
fusal of entry to, or the removal of, any person. 
2. The National Council of Provinces may not exclude the public, including 
the media, from a sitting of a committee unless it is reasonable and justifiable to 
do so in an open and democratic society”.  
The Constitutional Court itself acknowledged in Doctors for Life that “pub-
                                 
14. FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, supra note 12, at 68. 
15. JOHN M. ACKERMAN / IRMA E. SANDOVAL-BALLESTEROS, The Global Explosion of 
Freedom of Information Laws, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 85, 85-86 (2006). 
16. Which, in fact, stands out on the global stage as a particularly powerful oversight 
agency (see JOHN M. ACKERMAN, Mexico’s Freedom of Information Law in International Per-
spective, in Mexico's Right-to-Know Reforms: Civil Society Perspectives 314, 314-317, Jona-
than Fox ed., 2007.  
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lic involvement in the legislative process requires access to information”. Fur-
thermore, it referred to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
of 1993 in Nova Scotia, Canada, which recognized that access to government in-
formation may be necessary “to facilitate informed public participation in policy 
formulation”17. Although the Court does not refer to the South African access to 
information framework, it is worth noting that the right of access to information is 
recognized in Section 32 of the Constitution18 and the Promotion of Access to In-
formation Act 2 of 2000, the constitutionally mandated legislation to give effect 
to the right. 
 
3. The third generation: The right to civil society participation in administrative policy-
making. 
The first two generations of participatory rights seemed to exclude from their 
ambit a significant piece of modern administrative action: rulemaking. The first-
generation right of defense accommodated participation but only in the formula-
tion of individual measures. On the other hand, the second-generation right to 
transparency promoted access to public policymaking but was a more passive 
form of participation since it did not allow in itself for the exercise of direct citi-
zen influence on policymaking. The realization of this gap becomes more salient 
once we take into account an ongoing development: the rise of the administrative 
state19. In the modern administrative/regulatory state the quality of the democratic 
process should, therefore, also be judged against the criterion of the democratic 
quality of the administrative rulemaking process, since rules produced at the ad-
                                 
17. Doctors for Life, at para. 131 n. 30. 
18. Section 32 (“Access to information”): 
1. Everyone has the right of access to - 
a. any information held by the state; and 
b. any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. 
2. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for 
reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state. 
19. Almost sixty years ago, Justice Jackson characterized the rise of the administrative 
state as “probably the most significant legal trend of the last century” (Federal Trade Comm'n 
v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). The phrase “rise of the 
administrative state” can be found over 500 times in the literature (JONATHAN R. SIEGEL, Law 
and Longitude, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 57 n. 285). For the rise of the administrative state in Europe, 
see GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe, in Regulating Eu-
rope 47, Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996. 
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ministrative level are increasingly important, both in terms of their volume and 
their scope20. 
The traditional model of administrative law, premised upon an idealized per-
ception of representative democracy, would conceive of the administrative agency 
as a mere “transmission belt” for implementing specific legislative directions in 
particular cases21. The “transmission belt” theory fails both empirically and nor-
matively: empirically, because “broad legislative directives will rarely dispose of 
particular cases once the relevant facts have been accurately ascertained. More 
frequently, the application of legislative directives requires the agency to reweigh 
and reconcile the often nebulous or conflicting policies behind the directives in 
the context of a particular factual situation with a particular constellation of af-
fected interests”22. Normatively, because “[a]lthough democratic legislation can 
provide guiding principles, parliaments have neither the time nor the expertise to 
sift the changing scientific data in search of responsible regulatory solutions”23; 
therefore, we would want (and need) supplementary administrative policymaking. 
Furthermore, if the transmission belt theory were true, this would mean that what 
would also be “transmitted” into administrative action would be the legitimacy 
inefficiencies of parliamentary institutions identified above. Last, even if the leg-
islature exercises certain forms of oversight by means of parliamentary control 
(for example, hearings, commissions of inquiry) and its budgetary powers, this 
would be far from ensuring the “transmission belt” ideal24. 
                                 
20. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Ger-
many a Model?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1279, 1295-1296 (1994). See, also, CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, 
Rulemaking. How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, 13-20, 3rd ed., 2003 
(compiling data to document the “formidable volume” of rules. For instance, the average num-
ber of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations during the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton administrations was 71.982, 94.777, 109.599, 125.664, and 134.173 respectively). 
21. See A.A. BERLE, JR., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 Harv. L. 
Rev. 430, 431 (1917) (noting that “administrative law is the law applicable to the transmission 
of the will of the state, from its source to the point of its application”). 
22. RICHARD B. STEWART, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1669, 1684 (1975). See, also, JERRY L. MASHAW, Due Process in the Administrative 
State 22 (1985) (noting that congressional statutes themselves require administrative agencies 
to make trade-offs between, for example, the need for public health or safety and the need for 
employment, product diversity, and a vibrant economy). 
23. BRUCE ACKERMAN, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 694 
(2000) (noting as an example that “when parliaments have tried to make specific environmen-
tal decisions, the results have sometimes been egregiously counterproductive”). 
24. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Regulation and Public Law in Comparative Perspec-
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A similar criticism would apply to a closely related construction which 
seems to be still influential in European parliamentary systems. This is the “chain 
of legitimacy” idea. According to this view, administrative action is legitimate not 
only when (or because) it enacts specific legislative mandates, but because admin-
istrative institutions themselves draw their legitimacy from the public through this 
chain reaching down to the people. The picture is this: people elect their parlia-
mentarians that elect the Prime Minister that selects her cabinet that, in turn, ap-
points agency officials. This description should suffice to suggest its deficiencies: 
this chain of legitimacy seems to be too long, thus increasing the risk of an indi-
vidual link breaking loose – in addition to the legitimacy lacunae associated with 
each individual stage. The picture becomes even more complicated if we take into 
account that many of these agencies are designed as independent authorities, thus 
challenging the very formal existence of this “chain of legitimacy” in the first 
place. 
This is where the third-generation participation rights come in. If the poli-
cymaking work that administrative agencies carry out is indeed important and 
elections at periodic intervals have limits in their legitimizing force, we are in 
need of an additional legitimating mechanism. The direct involvement of the pub-
lic in the administrative policymaking process could provide such a mechanism. 
The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.), which was adopted in 1946, 
provides such a model especially with respect to informal rulemaking. Section 
553 of the A.P.A. stipulates that, when making rules or regulations having bind-
ing effect on private parties, the agency must provide notice of its proposal, an 
opportunity for affected parties to comment, and “a concise general statement” of 
the basis and purpose of the rules25. Furthermore, the A.P.A. empowers a review-
ing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law”26. Variations of the A.P.A. notice-and-comment model have 
spread into various jurisdictions, so far as Taiwan or Argentina. Recent trends at 
the EU administration level indicate that the EU – in particular, the European 
Commission – might also be moving toward recognizing a right of civil society 
participation in European governance. This was quite clearly indicated in the 
                                 
tive, 60 U. Toronto L.J. 519, 526 (“just as the legislature does not have the time, expertise, or 
foresight to write detailed statutes ex ante, so, too, it lacks the ability to provide comprehensive 
oversight ex post”). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 503 (b)-(c). 
26. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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2001 White Paper on Governance27, in which participation features prominently 
as one of the principles underpinning good governance in the Union. The Com-
mission stresses that “the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies de-
pend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain – from concep-
tion to implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence 
in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies. Participation cru-
cially depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when de-
veloping and implementing EU policies”. In 2002, the Commission issued the 
“Communication on Consultation”28 which reiterates its commitment to encourag-
ing “more involvement of interested parties through a more transparent consulta-
tion process” and provides general principles and standards for consultation that 
help the Commission to rationalize its consultation procedures. This emphasis on 
stakeholder participation is a recurring theme in Commission policy documents29 
and relevant provisions are included in the Treaty of Lisbon30. However, Doctors 
for Life moves beyond that in bringing back direct citizen input into the legislative 
process itself. Therefore, the following section will argue that this introduces a 
fourth generation of participation rights. 
 
B. The fourth generation of participation rights: Participation in legislative policy-
making and the “liberty of the ancients”. 
It has been argued in the literature that the structure and decisionmaking 
                                 
27. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, European Governance: A White Pa-
per, COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001. 
28. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commis-
sion: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and min-
imum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 fi-
nal Brussels, 11.12.2002. 
29. A relatively recent one being the European Commission’s Third strategic review of 
Better Regulation in the European Union, Brussels, 28.1.2009, COM(2009) 15 final, p. 7. 
30. According to Article 11 of the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
“1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associa-
tions the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union 
action. 
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with repre-
sentative associations and civil society. 
3. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned 
in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent”. 
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processes of the U.S. Congress are conducive neither to participation from the 
public nor to deliberation. Although legislative hearings – when they occur – 
nominally allow various interest groups to present and explain their positions, 
Congress, as a body, does not spend much time mulling over the issues and argu-
ments raised. Legislative committees control, in essence, the legislative process. 
The members of these committees engage in agenda control, vote trading, and 
log-rolling in order to obtain votes for the regulatory legislation that they sup-
port31. The legislatures of other countries are not immune from such criticism. In 
fact, I would argue that this reflects a broader pattern of what could be called a 
“legislative democratic deficit” inherent in modern democratic systems, whereby 
easy associations between legislative performance and democratic preferences are 
viewed with skepticism32. 
In view of this “legislative democratic deficit,” a reading of the Court’s 
statement in Doctors for Life that the South African constitutional democracy 
combines representative and participatory elements would be that the latter com-
plement the former. Or even that these participatory elements remedy potential 
deficiencies of the representative system. The Court accepts the idea of comple-
mentarity: “In the overall scheme of our Constitution, the representative and par-
ticipatory elements of our democracy should not be seen as being in tension with 
each other. They must be seen as mutually supportive. General elections, the 
foundation of representative democracy, would be meaningless without massive 
participation by the voters. The participation by the public on a continuous basis 
provides vitality to the functioning of representative democracy”33. However, this 
passage is less explicit regarding the idea of remedying representative deficien-
cies. A related passage from Justice Sachs’ concurring opinion is also telling: 
“This constitutional matrix makes it clear that although regular elections and a 
multi-party system of democratic government are fundamental to our constitu-
tional democracy, they are not exhaustive of it. Their constitutional objective is 
explicitly declared at a foundational level to be to ensure accountability, respon-
siveness and openness. The express articulation of this triad of principles would 
                                 
31. For these arguments, see MARK SEIDENFELD, A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1544-45 (1992). 
32. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda. The Reform of the 
American Regulatory State, 34-38 (1992). See, also, YVES MÉNY / YVES SUREL, The Constitu-
tive Ambiguity of Populism, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge 1, 7-11, YVES MÉNY & 
YVES SUREL (eds.), 2002.  
33. Doctors for Life, at para. 115. 
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be redundant if it was simply to be subsumed into notions of electoral democracy. 
Clearly it is intended to add something fundamental to such notions”34. 
When it comes to the specifics of the duty to facilitate public involvement in 
the context of this representative/participatory democracy, the majority explains 
that “Parliament and the provincial legislatures have broad discretion to determine 
how best to fulfil their constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement in 
a given case, so long as they act reasonably. Undoubtedly, this obligation may be 
fulfilled in different ways and is open to innovation on the part of the legislatures. 
In the end, however, the duty to facilitate public involvement will often require 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to provide citizens with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard in the making of the laws that will govern them. Our Con-
stitution demands no less”35. 
This is one of the novelties of Doctors for Life: Traditionally, parliamentary 
policymaking was (and still is) perceived as the hallmark of representative de-
mocracy. And it was after the emergence of the third-generation participation 
rights that the idea of direct public input came to the fore. But then the focus of 
bringing the people into the policymaking process was on administrative policy-
making. This was understandable from a practical point of view as well, given 
that agencies have fewer members than legislatures do and they regulate a nar-
rower set of issues; hence, administrative agencies were probably a more effective 
locus for direct citizen participation. In other words, the argument would be: since 
nowadays much of policymaking occurs outside the legislature, and if I was con-
vincing that the “transmission belt” and “chain of legitimacy” theories do not op-
erate well once we move into the domain of administrative policymaking, then 
civil society participation in this type of policymaking not only makes sense but is 
also a desirable policy. However, Doctors for Life goes beyond that, for it brings 
this process of direct public input back into the legislative realm. 
Therefore, in an interesting twist, by promoting participatory rights in legis-
lative policymaking, Doctors for Life renders citizen participation in administra-
tive policymaking an older-generation right, even while other legal orders are cur-
rently still moving toward adopting such participatory processes in the regulatory 
realm. Nevertheless, even as a fourth-generation participation right, I would argue 
that the right to participate in the legislative process is not all that novel. The ra-
tionale underlying civil society participation in both legislative and administrative 
policymaking is essentially the same. That is to say, representative democracy and 
                                 
34. Doctors for Life, at para. 228. 
35. Doctors for Life, at para. 145 
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periodic elections have – as I already argued – their limits as to how much legiti-
macy they can confer upon an ever expanding public policymaking whether it is 
produced in the legislature or in administrative agencies. The difference is in the 
number of links between the citizenry and the policymaking body in the context 
of the “chain of legitimacy” picture discussed above. In legislative policymaking, 
the first and only link is between the people and the representative body, whereas 
in administrative policymaking, the intervening steps are more in that administra-
tive agencies produce policy subsequent to the adoption of a legislative frame-
work. However, the shared feature in both cases is that exclusive reliance on elec-
tions brings out the weakness of the first link, i.e., the one between the people and 
elected representatives. One could further argue that precisely because legislatures 
discuss the general framework in which value judgments are more often implicat-
ed, direct public input would be especially relevant at this stage. 
The second reason that this fourth-generation right is not as novel as one 
would expect is that, as suggested earlier and in the title of this essay, it revitalizes 
the “liberty of the ancients”. The “liberty of the ancients” was not just about se-
lecting public officials but, in fact, more about “active and constant participation 
in collective power,” in other words, about citizens being directly involved in de-
cisionmaking that affected the community. In recent years, it seemed as if the 
former prong of the “liberty of the ancients” had somewhat overshadowed the lat-
ter. The emphasis – especially in countries in transition – was on ensuring free, 
fair, and competitive elections, broad suffrage and a multi-party system that 
would allow for alternations in power. This is the reasonable and necessary first 
step in a reform strategy, but it does not conclude the process. What is needed is 
what was termed as transition “from elections to democracy”36. Doctors for Life 
reminds us of this broader scope of the “liberty of the ancients” in allowing the 
citizenry to have a say at step one, when policy is adopted in the quintessential in-
stitution of representative democracy, the Parliament. As Justice Sachs wrote in 
his concurring opinion: 
True to the manner in which it itself was sired, the Constitution 
predicates and incorporates within its vision the existence of a perma-
nently engaged citizenry alerted to and involved with all legislative 
programmes. The people have more than the right to vote in periodical 
                                 
36. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable 
Government in Hungary and Poland, 2005, (arguing that full democracy cannot be attained un-
less the policymaking process is accountable to citizens through transparent procedures that 
seek to incorporate public input). 
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elections, fundamental though that is. And more is guaranteed to them 
than the opportunity to object to legislation before and after it is passed, 
and to criticise it from the sidelines while it is being adopted. They are 
accorded the right on an ongoing basis and in a very direct manner, to 
be (and to feel themselves to be) involved in the actual processes of 
law-making. Elections are of necessity periodical. Accountability, re-
sponsiveness and openness, on the other hand, are by their very nature 
ubiquitous and timeless. They are constants of our democracy, to be 
ceaselessly asserted in relation to ongoing legislative and other activi-
ties of government. Thus it would be a travesty of our Constitution to 
treat democracy as going into a deep sleep after elections, only to be 
kissed back to short spells of life every five years37. 
This section tried to situate the novelty of Doctors for Life within the evolu-
tion of participatory rights while also putting the degree of this “novelty” into per-
spective. A right that revitalizes the “liberty of the ancients” definitionally cannot 
be all that novel. This is not to say that this fourth-generation right comes without 
challenges of its own. The last two parts of this article will touch on these chal-
lenges. 
 
IV. Judicial enforcement of the fourth-generation participation right. 
A. The novelty of Doctors for Life: A judicially enforceable constitutional man-
date for legislative participatory processes. 
As the Court notes, in a number of jurisdictions, legislatures have increasing-
ly held public hearings and consultations with civil society organizations and citi-
zens in order to facilitate participation in their law-making processes38. However, 
a major distinguishing factor is that the South African Constitutional Court opted 
for ensuring that participatory democracy functions as an immediately enforcea-
ble feature of the legislative process39. The majority of the Court characterized the 
obligation to facilitate public involvement as a requirement of the lawmaking pro-
                                 
37. Doctors for Life, at para. 230. 
38. Doctors for Life, at para. 143 (especially n.152); see also para. 230 n. 6. 
39. See Doctors for Life, at para. 231 (Sachs J, concurring): “Although in other countries 
nods in the direction of participatory democracy may serve as hallmarks of good government 
in a political sense, in our country active and ongoing public involvement is a requirement of 
constitutional government in a legal sense. It is not just a matter of legislative etiquette or good 
governmental manners. It is one of constitutional obligation”. 
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cess and stressed that the Court not only has a right but also has a duty to ensure 
that the lawmaking process prescribed by the Constitution is observed. And if the 
conditions for law-making processes have not been complied with, it has the duty 
to say so and declare the resulting statute invalid. On that basis, it declared two of 
the health bills unconstitutional. 
The question of whether the Court could impose obligations of consultation 
upon the legislature divided the members of the Court. And rightly so. Judicial 
review is the key feature that, in essence, determines the difference between a 
programmatic constitutional provision and an enforceable mandate. The U.S. ex-
perience would be relevant in this respect: as we already mentioned, the U.S. 
A.P.A. introducing rulemaking procedures was passed in 1946; however, it was 
not until a few decades later that U.S. courts beefed up those provisions and im-
posed more and more obligations on U.S. agencies with respect to participatory 
processes. The level of robustness of judicial review that the Court put forth in 
Doctors for Life warrants closer examination. It was argued in the literature that 
“the court effectively concluded that the right of public participation in the law-
making process weighs more heavily in the South African democracy than the 
need for the court to defer to a democratically elected parliament on such is-
sues”40. It is true that the Court struck down two statutes on the basis of the 
NCOP’s failure to comply with the prescribed legislative process and that this 
would characteristically invoke the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”41. However, 
the passage just quoted needs qualification as the Court tried to take steps in a 
more minimalist direction as well. The following section takes on these questions. 
 
B. Limits on and self-restraint from the judiciary in enforcing legislative partici-
patory processes. 
In order to appreciate the scope of the Court’s intervention in Doctors for 
Life, it would be useful to invoke the idea of judicial review involving a “spec-
trum of deference” to the political branches42. In this scheme, the political ques-
tion doctrine occupies the one extreme end, that is to say, courts abstain altogether 
from reviewing certain decisions of the political branches (“political questions”). 
                                 
40. REYNAUD N. DANIELS / JASON BRICKHILL, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and 
the South African Constitutional Court, 25 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 371, 396-397 (2006). 
41. As the term was famously coined, in ALEXANDER BICKEL, The Least Dangerous 
Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed., 1986. 
42. See RACHEL E. BARKOW, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 250 (2002). 
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Along the spectrum are other issues on which the political branches enjoy consid-
erable, but not absolute, deference. Finally, at the other end are the questions on 
which the Court alone provides interpretation almost without giving any defer-
ence to the other branches. 
First, it might surprise some readers that the South African Constitutional 
Court went so far as to examine the adequacy of the legislative process as carried 
out by the NCOP. To them, this would be a textbook example of “interna corpor-
is,” internal procedures of the legislative body that would qualify as non-
reviewable “political questions”. However, what in certain other legal orders 
would be a political question outside the purview of the judiciary is justiciable in 
South Africa given a specific textual hook in the Constitution: As already noted, 
Section 167(4) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Constitutional Court in a 
number of crucial political areas, including the question of whether Parliament 
has failed to fulfill a constitutional obligation (subsection (e))43. 
This logically prior issue resolved, the question now pertains to the appro-
priate degree of deference the Court should give to the legislature’s decision as to 
how to discharge the duty to facilitate public involvement under Section 72(1)(a). 
I would argue that the degree of deference hinged on two competing approaches 
to Section 72(1)(a) although which one prevailed is not as clear. The first ap-
proach would view Section 72(1)(a) as part of the structural Constitution regulat-
ing how political bodies conduct their business. The second approach would view 
this Section as guaranteeing a fundamental right. The “structural” view would 
find textual and contextual support given that Section 72(1)(a) is part of Chapter 4 
of the South African Constitution on Parliament and not of Chapter 2 (“Bill of 
Rights”). The Court was aware of this when it acknowledged that “[w]e are not, 
of course, in this case directly concerned with the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
but with section 72 of the Constitution. There are powerful reasons why a restrict-
ed approach to standing of litigants is appropriate in cases such as this”44. 
The “structural” approach differs from an alternative reading of the case 
which points to a “fundamental rights” approach. It was suggested in the literature 
that the case “does not focus on the substance of the statutes that were the source 
of the challenge. Instead, the court, as the enforcer of human rights, examined 
whether the Legislature denied the enjoyment of one component of the fundamen-
tal human right to political participation, the general right to take part in the con-
                                 
43. See Doctors for Life, at para. 21ff. 
44. Doctors for Life, at para. 217. 
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duct of public affairs”45. Opponents of this position would point out that it cannot 
find explicit textual support in the judgment. Even when the Court writes that 
“[t]he duty to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process is an aspect 
of the right to political participation”46, this does not amount to its actually saying 
that there is a “fundamental right” to be involved in the legislative process equal 
in nature to the right to vote in general elections. I think it would be fair to say 
that the language of the Court is not very clear regarding this point, but it should 
not be construed to exclude the “fundamental rights” approach. Similarly, the 
mode of judicial reasoning would not be hostile to such an approach either. It is 
telling that, as we already saw, Justice Ngcobo begins the part of his opinion re-
lated to “public involvement” by citing a number of international human rights in-
struments. This does not mean that the majority draws from international and for-
eign legal sources to establish the basis of or “create” from scratch a right to par-
ticipation in the legislative process that was otherwise non-existent in the South 
African constitutional order. The dissent itself does not suggest that this is the na-
ture of the majority’s enterprise. Rather, Justice Yacoob argues that none of these 
sources “properly read provide that legislation will be invalid unless some gener-
ally stated unspecific requirement of public involvement is fulfilled”47. However, 
the way the majority structures the first part of its argumentation around human 
rights documents indicates that the “fundamental rights” approach might be guid-
ing its reasoning even if the language is not equally straightforward.  
The importance of choosing between these approaches – both of which are 
plausible – is that a “fundamental rights” approach would accommodate a more 
searching judicial scrutiny: Courts are traditionally more comfortable in review-
ing the constitutionality of acts that implicate fundamental rights. And – one 
could say – they would, in any case, be more comfortable doing that than telling 
the legislature how to conduct its business internally. Regardless of whether a 
“fundamental rights” approach is indeed guiding the Court, I would add that the 
majority opinion did try to take some precautions and did not move in as a maxi-
malist direction as one might have thought at first sight. 
More specifically, the Court adopted – as mentioned above – a reasonable-
ness test to evaluate the conduct of the legislature. This raised concerns with both 
Justice Yacoob writing in dissent and Justice van der Westhuizen writing a sepa-
rate opinion concurring in the dissent; they highlighted that the reasonableness 
                                 
45. KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY / RASHIDA MANJOO, supra note 11, at 3. 
46. Doctors for Life, at para. 90. 
47. Doctors for Life, at para. 329 (Yacoob J, dissenting). 
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standard cannot offer clear-cut and objective solutions. A complete opposite posi-
tion criticized the test as a minimalist approach to public participation48. The rea-
sonableness test recalls the “arbitrary and capricious” standard that U.S. courts 
employ under the A.P.A. to review administrative acts, including the procedure 
through which they were adopted. It is true that in the U.S. experience courts have 
utilized this standard to expand their reach49. However, this does not mean that 
the South African Constitutional Court, in endorsing the reasonableness test, will 
overstep its boundaries. In addition to enunciating the test, the Court indicated a 
few factors that it will be taking into account in applying that test: 
Reasonableness is an objective standard which is sensitive to the 
facts and circumstances of a particular case. “In dealing with the issue 
of reasonableness,” this Court has explained, “context is all important”. 
Whether a legislature has acted reasonably in discharging its duty to fa-
cilitate public involvement will depend on a number of factors. The na-
ture and importance of the legislation and the intensity of its impact on 
the public are especially relevant. Reasonableness also requires that ap-
propriate account be paid to practicalities such as time and expense, 
which relate to the efficiency of the law-making process. Yet the saving 
of money and time in itself does not justify inadequate opportunities for 
public involvement. In addition, in evaluating the reasonableness of 
Parliament’s conduct, this Court will have regard to what Parliament it-
self considered to be appropriate public involvement in the light of the 
legislation’s content, importance and urgency. Indeed, this Court will 
                                 
48. See LINDA NYATI, Public Participation: What has the Constitutional Court given the 
public?, 12 Law, Development & Democracy 102, 109, 2002, (noting that “[t]he fact that the 
test for reasonableness in the duty to facilitate public involvement has no procedural safe-
guards leaves the legislature with ample discretion to meet the just minimums set in both the 
rationality and the reasonableness tests”). 
49. See PATRICIA M. WALD, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership 
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 Tulsa L.J. 221, 233-234, 1996, (“Arbitrary and ca-
pricious’ has turned out to be the catch-all label for attacks on the agency’s rationale, its com-
pleteness or logic, in cases where no misinterpretation of the statute, constitutional issues or 
lack of evidence in the record to support key findings is alleged. Frequently the arbitrary and 
capricious charge is grounded on the complaint that the agency has departed from its prior ra-
tionale in other cases without admitting it or explaining why. Sometimes, the agency is re-
buffed because it did not give adequate consideration to an alternative solution. But most often 
the court simply finds the agency’s explanation for what it is doing ‘inadequate.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
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pay particular attention to what Parliament considers to be appropriate 
public involvement. 
This means that there will be cases in which it might be easier to conclude 
that there has been a violation of the duty to facilitate public involvement in the 
legislative process. One such example would be when the legislature has publicly 
committed to carrying out consultations on a very significant bill that has already 
engendered considerable interest among citizens, and then it reneges on this 
commitment. Other cases will require a more delicate exercise in balancing.  
It is worth noting that subsequent judgments by the Constitutional Court do 
not seem to confirm the fear of maximalism. In a judgment handed down the day 
after Doctors for Life50, the Court with the same 8-3 majority held that a provin-
cial legislature whose provincial boundary is being altered is required by the Con-
stitution to approve such alteration. The Court explained that the proposed consti-
tutional amendment would have had the effect of relocating a whole community 
from one province to another province. Therefore, it had a direct impact on a dis-
creet and identifiable section of the population, as it threatened an important and 
not easily reversible change to the provincial status of that community. The con-
sequences of the amendment were of considerable symbolic and practical im-
portance, affecting the identity of the people to be transferred and changing the 
structures and personnel responsible for welfare payments, health services and 
education. Therefore, the provincial legislature, in not holding any public hearings 
or inviting any written submissions, had acted unreasonably and failed to fulfill its 
duty to involve the public in making its decision. For that reason, the majority 
concluded that the relative part of the Amendment altering the boundary was in-
valid.  
A more recent judgment51 similarly concerned an Amendment altering pro-
vincial boundaries. However, this time the outcome was different. Van der 
Westhuizen J (writing for a majority of nine justices) found that the legislature had 
fulfilled its constitutional duty to facilitate public involvement having taken rea-
sonable measures to solicit public comment: it called for and received submis-
sions on the location of the municipality in question. A public hearing was also 
held. In the last judgment52 in this series of cases, the Court was unanimous in 
                                 
50. See Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of South Africa nº 2, 2007 (6) 
South African Law Reports 477 (CC) (Judgment of 18 August 2006). 
51. Merafong Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of South Africa, [2008] 
ZACC 10 (Judgment of 13 June 2008). 
52. Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa 
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finding no violation. The case concerned the validity of two Acts seeking to relo-
cate a municipality to a different province. The Court found that from the content 
of various transcripts of public hearings, held both at national and provincial lev-
el, it was clear that public participation had been facilitated by both Parliament 
and the provincial legislature. The Minister had published both Acts for public 
comment in accordance with section 74(5)(a) of the Constitution and persons 
wishing to comment on the proposed amendment had been invited to send their 
written submissions. Therefore, the Court concluded that public participation had 
indeed been facilitated by both Parliament and the provincial legislature. 
What this series of cases suggests is that after the pair of the 2006 judgments 
(Doctors for Life and Matatiele) on no other occasion has the Constitutional Court 
struck down legislation on the basis of lack of sufficient public involvement in the 
legislative process. One might say that this is perhaps an indication of the Court 
exercising judicial restraint. However, I would be more sympathetic to a reading 
suggesting that the legislature is taking its constitutional obligations after Doctors 
for Life seriously. Merafong and Poverty Alleviation represented much less clear-
cut cases of failure than did Doctors for Life or Matatiele, where the legislatures 
themselves had envisaged a standard of what was appropriate in terms of public 
involvement and then some of them had failed to meet it. Merafong and Poverty 
Alleviation do not necessarily indicate a retreat from the earlier position or show 
new judicial restraint because it was much less obvious in these cases that there 
was a violation. At any rate, the cases after Doctors for Life indicate that, at least 
in terms of practical outcomes, the fears of judicial excesses in the aftermath of 
Doctors for Life have not materialized. 
 
V. Conclusion: Lessons from Doctors for Life. 
Doctors for Life was welcomed by scholars viewing in it a promise for en-
couraging a participatory and deliberative legislature, a fact that would already be 
in line with a rich tradition of deliberative democracy53. In a similar vein, it was 
argued that the Court, though appearing to “act counter-majoritarian,” is essential-
ly supporting democracy in enforcing these participatory provisions54. However, 
even those convinced by Doctors for Life that participatory elements constitute a 
beneficial addition to a representative democracy add a cautionary note against 
                                 
and Others, Case CCT 86/08 (Judgment of 24 February 2010). 
53. See DENNIS M. DAVIS, Transformation and the Democratic Case for Judicial Re-
view: The South African Experience, 5 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 45, 56-57 (2007). 
54. REYNAUD N. DANIELS / JASON BRICKHILL, supra note 40, at 399. 
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the automatic expansion of this model to other countries: “A transformation of 
human rights norms to include participatory democracy … should be based in 
greater knowledge about what it means on the ground in countries with different 
histories and varied social and economic contexts”55. 
Adding an additional layer of accountability in legislative operations, name-
ly the judicially enforceable mandate that the legislature receive public input, will 
likely lead to delays in a process that is already generally moving slowly. This in-
vokes the familiar – in the U.S. administrative law literature – notion of the “ossi-
fication” of the rulemaking process due to all the accountability requirements. A 
skeptic would say that the danger of “ossification” might even be graver in the 
context of legislative policymaking due to its potentially more severe repercus-
sions: a paralyzed legislature would mean that major initiatives would be put to a 
halt; this, in turn, might have an impact on the administrative implementation of 
programs that might be a priority for the democratically elected government.  
Our response to that fear would, in fact, replicate similar responses given to 
the “ossification” argument in the administrative context: “Procedural constraints 
that require consultation and openness … introduce delay into the process, but 
they provide an important alternative route to democratic legitimacy that permits 
the participation of groups whose interests may be poorly represented by political 
parties in the legislature”56. Furthermore, the South African Constitutional Court 
seems to be conscious of such dangers. Doctors for Life struck down legislation 
because the legislature had followed no process of public involvement whatsoev-
er, not because a certain process was not sufficiently elaborate or sophisticated. 
The reasonableness test might offer adequate safeguards against excesses on both 
sides: the legislature may not completely ignore its constitutional obligation to re-
ceive public input on significant bills, but the judiciary may not impose burdens 
of the sort that would freeze the operation of the representative institution. 
However, a constitutional mandate and its judicial enforcement will most 
likely not suffice for the construction of a deliberative legislature with robust citi-
zen participation. Legal reform should be accompanied by initiatives aiming at 
building civil society capacity on the ground and reaching out to less represented 
or salient groups to solicit their comments. This would allow more members of 
the public to be involved in and benefit from these participatory processes. Under 
these conditions, Doctors for Life might be offering a very interesting lesson in 
                                 
55. KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY / RASHIDA MANJOO, supra note 11, at 40. 
56. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Introduction, in Economics of Administrative Law xxiv 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2007). 
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revitalizing the “liberty of the ancients” and bringing it back into the liberal de-
mocracy of the moderns. 
 
Doctors for Life International v. the Speaker of the National Assembly  
& Others 
Constitutional Court of South Africa 
2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) 
[Note: As indicated in my Comment, this is a 198-page long judgment. 
Therefore, the excerpt below has been heavily edited. All internal citations have 
been omitted] 
 
VI. Did the NCOP and the provincial legislatures facilitate public involvement in 
their respective legislative processes as required by the Constitution?  
What do the public involvement provisions require? 
[73] The requirement to facilitate public involvement in the legislative pro-
cesses of the NCOP is governed by section 72, which provides:  
“(1) The National Council of Provinces must – 
(a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes 
of the Council and its committees; and  
(b) conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and 
those of its committees, in public, but reasonable measures may be 
taken –  
(i) to regulate public access, including access of the media, to the 
Council and its committees; and  
(ii) to provide for the searching of any person and, where appro-
priate, the refusal of entry to, or the removal of, any person.  
(2) The National Council of Provinces may not exclude the public, including 
the media, from a sitting of a committee unless it is reasonable and justifiable to 
do so in an open and democratic society”. 
[74] Identical duties are imposed on the National Assembly by section 59 
and on the provincial legislatures by section 118….  
[77] It is therefore common cause between all the parties to these proceed-
ings that sections 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a) require public participation in the legisla-
tive processes of the NCOP and the provincial legislatures. However, the parties 
differ on the nature and scope of the duty to facilitate public involvement. 
[78] The contentions of the parties require this Court to consider the mean-
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ing and scope of the duty to facilitate public involvement. This duty must be con-
strued and understood in the light of: (a) the constitutional role of the NCOP in 
the national legislative process and, in particular, its relationship to the provincial 
legislatures; (b) the right to political participation under international and foreign 
law; and (c) the nature of our constitutional democracy…. 
 
The right to political participation under international and foreign law 
[90] The right to political participation is a fundamental human right, which 
is set out in a number of international and regional human rights instruments. In 
most of these instruments, the right consists of at least two elements: a general 
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs; and a more specific right to vote 
and/or to be elected. Thus, article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides:  
“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guarantee-
ing the free expression of the will of the electors. 
[91] Significantly, the ICCPR guarantees not only the “right” but also the 
“opportunity” to take part in the conduct of public affairs. This imposes an obliga-
tion on states to take positive steps to ensure that their citizens have an opportuni-
ty to exercise their right to political participation. The right enshrined in article 25 
must be understood in the light of article 19 of the ICCPR, which provides: 
“2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice”. 
[92] Both articles 19 and 25 guarantee not only the positive right to political 
participation, but simultaneously impose a duty on states to facilitate public par-
ticipation in the conduct of public affairs by ensuring that this right can be real-
ised. Taken together, they seek to ensure that citizens have the necessary infor-
mation and the effective opportunity to exercise the right to political participation. 
[93] Since the adoption of the ICCPR, various regional human rights instru-
ments and declarations have reaffirmed the right to political participation. The 
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relevant regional human rights instrument in the context of our country is the Af-
rican [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), adopt-
ed on 27 June 1981, which was acceded to by our country on 9 July 1996. The 
African Charter is more specific than the ICCPR in spelling out the obligation of 
states parties to ensure that people are well informed of the rights in the African 
Charter. The relevant articles are articles 9, 13 and 25 which provide: 
 
“Article 9 
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.  
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opin-
ions within the law…. 
 
Article 13 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of 
his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance 
with the provisions of the law. 
 
Article 25  
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and en-
sure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and 
rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood”. 
[94] Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights provides in arti-
cle 23 that all citizens shall enjoy the right and opportunity “to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. The 
Harare Commonwealth Declaration proclaims the “individual’s inalienable right 
to participate by means of free and democratic processes in framing the society in 
which he or she lives”. The Inter-American Democratic Charter re-affirms that 
“the participatory nature of democracy in [the American] countries in different 
aspects of public life contributes to the consolidation of democratic values and to 
freedom and solidarity in the Hemisphere”. It further asserts that “[i]t is the right 
and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own 
development. This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise 
of democracy. Promoting and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens 
democracy”. 
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Nature and scope of the right. 
[95] The precise nature and scope of the international law right to participate 
in the conduct of public affairs is a matter for individual states to determine 
through their laws and policies…. 
[96] The right to political participation has been described as an open-
textured “programmatic” right, which is open to experimental reformulation and 
which will necessarily change in the light of ongoing national experiences ... 
[98] The right to political participation includes but is not limited to the right 
to vote in an election. That right, which is specified in article 25(b) of the ICCPR, 
represents one institutionalisation of the right to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs. The broader right, which is provided for in article 25(a), envisages forms 
of political participation which are not limited to participation in the electoral 
process. It is now generally accepted that modes of participation may include not 
only indirect participation through elected representatives but also forms of direct 
participation…. 
[101] The idea of allowing the public to participate in the conduct of public 
affairs is not a new concept. In this country, the traditional means of public partic-
ipation is imbizo/lekgotla/bosberaad. This is a participatory consultation process 
that was, and still is, followed within the African communities. It is used as a fo-
rum to discuss issues affecting the community. This traditional method of public 
participation, a tradition which is widely used by the government, is both a practi-
cal and symbolic part of our democratic processes. It is a form of participatory 
democracy. 
[102] Neither is the idea of allowing the public to participate in the parlia-
mentary decision-making process a new concept. The right to political participa-
tion has deep historical roots, dating back to the Middle Ages. The Magna Carta 
guaranteed the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances ... 
[103] More recently, a growing number of national Constitutions, in particu-
lar those adopted since the entry into force of the ICCPR, expressly embrace the 
principle of participatory democracy. Several, like our Constitution, include pro-
visions that promote participation in law-making, whether through written peti-
tions, oral hearings or other mechanisms of public involvement. For example, the 
Constitution of Tanzania provides that “[e]very citizen has the right and the free-
dom to participate fully in the process leading to the decision on matters affecting 
him, his well-being or the nation”. Citizens of Portugal have the right to submit 
petitions, representations or complaints to governmental institutions and the law 
must determine conditions under which the National Assembly, sitting in plenary 
session, will consider these submissions. 
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[104] The Constitution of Colombia includes as one of the essential goals of 
the state, the goal “to facilitate the participation of everyone in the decisions that 
affect them and in the economic, political, administrative, and cultural life of the 
nation”. More specifically, it provides that “[a]ny citizen has the right to partici-
pate in the establishment, exercise, and control of political power. To make this 
decree effective the citizen may … [p]articipate in elections, plebiscites, referen-
dums, popular consultations, and other forms of democratic participation”. Other 
jurisdictions also provide for the direct involvement of their citizens in the law-
making process. 
 
Conclusions from international law and foreign law. 
[105] The international law right to political participation encompasses a 
general right to participate in the conduct of public affairs and a more specific 
right to vote and/or be elected into public office. The general right to participate 
in the conduct of public affairs includes engaging in public debate and dialogue 
with elected representatives at public hearings. But that is not all; it includes the 
duty to facilitate public participation in the conduct of public affairs by ensuring 
that citizens have the necessary information and effective opportunity to exercise 
the right to political participation. 
[106] While the right to political participation in international law can be 
achieved in multiple ways, it is clear that this right does not require less of a gov-
ernment than provision for meaningful exercise of choice in some form of elec-
toral process and public participation in the law-making process by permitting 
public debate and dialogue with elected representatives. In addition, this right is 
supported by the right to freedom of expression which includes the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information. In our country, the right to political partici-
pation is given effect not only through the political rights guaranteed in section 19 
of the Bill of Rights, as supported by the right to freedom of expression but also 
by imposing a constitutional obligation on legislatures to facilitate public partici-
pation in the law-making process. 
[107] The duty to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process un-
der our Constitution must therefore be understood as a manifestation of the inter-
national law right to political participation. Public involvement in the legislative 
and other processes of legislatures of our country is a more specific form of polit-
ical participation than the participation in the conduct of public affairs that is con-
templated by article 25 of the ICCPR.  
[108] Thus, the Constitutional Assembly, in framing our Constitution, was 
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not content only with the right to vote as an expression of the right to political 
participation. It opted for a more expansive role of the public in the conduct of 
public affairs by placing a higher value on public participation in the law-making 
process…. 
 
The nature of our constitutional democracy. 
[110] The international law right to political participation reflects a shared 
notion that a nation’s sovereign authority is one that belongs to its citizens, who 
“themselves should participate in government – though their participation may 
vary in degree”. This notion is expressed in the preamble of the Constitution, 
which states that the Constitution lays “the foundations for a democratic and open 
society in which government is based on the will of the people”. It is also ex-
pressed in constitutional provisions that require national and provincial legisla-
tures to facilitate public involvement in their processes. Through these provisions, 
the people of South Africa reserved for themselves part of the sovereign legisla-
tive authority that they otherwise delegated to the representative bodies they cre-
ated. 
[111] Our Constitution was inspired by a particular vision of a non-racial 
and democratic society in which government is based on the will of the people. 
Indeed, one of the goals that we have fashioned for ourselves in the Preamble of 
the Constitution is the establishment of “a society based on democratic values, so-
cial justice and fundamental human rights”. The very first provision of our Con-
stitution, which establishes the founding values of our constitutional democracy, 
includes as part of those values “a multi-party system of democratic government, 
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”. Commitment to princi-
ples of accountability, responsiveness and openness shows that our constitutional 
democracy is not only representative but also contains participatory elements. 
This is a defining feature of the democracy that is contemplated. It is apparent 
from the preamble of the Constitution that one of the basic objectives of our con-
stitutional enterprise is the establishment of a democratic and open government in 
which the people shall participate to some degree in the law-making process…. 
[115] In the overall scheme of our Constitution, the representative and par-
ticipatory elements of our democracy should not be seen as being in tension with 
each other. They must be seen as mutually supportive. General elections, the 
foundation of representative democracy, would be meaningless without massive 
participation by the voters. The participation by the public on a continuous basis 
provides vitality to the functioning of representative democracy. It encourages cit-
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izens of the country to be actively involved in public affairs, identify themselves 
with the institutions of government and become familiar with the laws as they are 
made. It enhances the civic dignity of those who participate by enabling their 
voices to be heard and taken account of. It promotes a spirit of democratic and 
pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely 
accepted and effective in practice. It strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in 
the eyes of the people. Finally, because of its open and public character it acts as a 
counterweight to secret lobbying and influence peddling. Participatory democracy 
is of special importance to those who are relatively disempowered in a country 
like ours where great disparities of wealth and influence exist…. 
 
The meaning and scope of the duty to facilitate public involvement. 
[118] Public involvement is not a uniquely South African concept. In other 
countries, notably, in the United States, it is a concept that is used in the context 
of rule-making by administrative agencies. It is one of the requirements of the 
rule-making process by these agencies. In the international terrain, there is a 
growing number of instruments that make provision for the principle of public 
participation, in particular, in the context of environmental issues. It is commonly 
used to refer to the active participation of the public in the decision-making pro-
cesses. The words “public involvement” and “public participation” are often used 
interchangeably. 
[119] The phrase “facilitate public involvement” is a broad concept, which 
relates to the duty to ensure public participation in the law-making process. The 
key words in this phrase are “facilitate” and “involvement”. To “facilitate” means 
to “make easy or easier,” “promote” or “help forward”. The phrase “public in-
volvement” is commonly used to describe the process of allowing the public to 
participate in the decision-making process. The dictionary definition of “involve” 
includes to “bring a person into a matter” while participation is defined as “[a] 
taking part with others (in an action or matter); … the active involvement of 
members of a community or organization in decisions which affect them”. 
[120] According to their plain and ordinary meaning, the words public in-
volvement or public participation refer to the process by which the public partici-
pates in something. Facilitation of public involvement in the legislative process, 
therefore, means taking steps to ensure that the public participate in the legislative 
process. That is the plain meaning of section 72(1)(a)…. 
[122] Our constitutional framework requires the achievement of a balanced 
relationship between representative and participatory elements in our democracy. 
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Section 72(1)(a), like section 59(1)(a) and section 118(1)(a), addresses the vital 
relationship between representative and participatory elements, which lies at the 
heart of the legislative function. It imposes a special duty on the legislature and 
pre-supposes that the legislature will have considerable discretion in determining 
how best to achieve this balanced relationship. The ultimate question is whether 
there has been the degree of public involvement that is required by the Constitu-
tion…. 
[124] It follows that Parliament and the provincial legislatures must be given 
a significant measure of discretion in determining how best to fulfil their duty to 
facilitate public involvement. This discretion will apply both in relation to the 
standard rules promulgated for public participation and the particular modalities 
appropriate for specific legislative programmes. Yet however great the leeway 
given to the legislature, the courts can, and in appropriate cases will, determine 
whether there has been the degree of public involvement that is required by the 
Constitution. 
[125] What is required by section 72(1)(a) will no doubt vary from case to 
case. In all events, however, the NCOP must act reasonably in carrying out its du-
ty to facilitate public involvement in its processes….  
[129] What is ultimately important is that the legislature has taken steps to 
afford the public a reasonable opportunity to participate effectively in the law-
making process. Thus construed, there are at least two aspects of the duty to facil-
itate public involvement. The first is the duty to provide meaningful opportunities 
for public participation in the law-making process. The second is the duty to take 
measures to ensure that people have the ability to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties provided. In this sense, public involvement may be seen as “a continuum that 
ranges from providing information and building awareness, to partnering in deci-
sion-making”. This construction of the duty to facilitate public involvement is not 
only consistent with our participatory democracy, but it is consistent with the in-
ternational law right to political participation. As pointed out, that right not only 
guarantees the positive right to participate in the public affairs, but it simultane-
ously imposes a duty on the State to facilitate public participation in the conduct 
of public affairs by ensuring that this right can be realised. It will be convenient 
here to consider each of these aspects, beginning with the broader duty to take 
steps to ensure that people have the capacity to participate. 
 
The duty to take steps to facilitate public involvement. 
[130] The Constitutional Assembly was acutely aware that our legacy of ra-
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cial discrimination, which was still fresh in their minds, could undermine the na-
tional effort to construct “a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people”. A majority of the people had, for many years, 
been denied the right to influence those who ruled over them. They had been dis-
criminated against in almost every sphere of life. The result was gross inequality 
in education, financial resources, access to knowledge and other areas that are 
crucial for effective participation in the law-making process. Merely to allow pub-
lic participation in the law-making process is, in the prevailing circumstances, not 
enough. More is required. Measures need to be taken to facilitate public participa-
tion in the law-making process. 
[131] Thus, Parliament and the provincial legislatures must provide notice of 
and information about the legislation under consideration and the opportunities 
for participation that are available. To achieve this, it may be desirable to provide 
public education that builds capacity for such participation. Public involvement in 
the legislative process requires access to information and the facilitation of learn-
ing and understanding in order to achieve meaningful involvement by ordinary 
citizens. In this regard, article 25 of the African Charter imposes an obligation on 
states parties to “promote and ensure through teaching, education and publica-
tion” the right to political participation. As the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
has asserted in interpreting the international law right to political participation, 
“[w]hatever form of constitution or government is in force, the [ICCPR] requires 
States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure 
that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects”. (The 
emphasis is mine.) . . . 
 
Public participation in the law-making process. 
[141] In my judgment, public participation in the law-making processes of 
the NCOP is the goal of the duty to facilitate public involvement comprehended 
in section 72(1)(a). Participation is the end to be achieved. To hold otherwise 
would be contrary to the participative nature of our democracy and the Constitu-
tion’s commitment to the principles of accountability, responsiveness and open-
ness. Parliament and all nine provinces therefore, in my view, properly conceded 
that the duty to facilitate public involvement contemplates public participation in 
the law-making process.  
[142] The conventional method of public participation in the law-making 
process is through the submission of written or oral representations on the bill un-
der consideration by Parliament or through a combination of both written and oral 
submissions…. 
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[145] To sum up, the duty to facilitate public involvement must be construed 
in the context of our constitutional democracy, which embraces the principle of 
participation and consultation. Parliament and the provincial legislatures have 
broad discretion to determine how best to fulfil their constitutional obligation to 
facilitate public involvement in a given case, so long as they act reasonably. Un-
doubtedly, this obligation may be fulfilled in different ways and is open to inno-
vation on the part of the legislatures. In the end, however, the duty to facilitate 
public involvement will often require Parliament and the provincial legislatures to 
provide citizens with a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the making of the 
laws that will govern them. Our Constitution demands no less. 
[146] In determining whether Parliament has complied with its duty to facili-
tate public participation in any particular case, the Court will consider what Par-
liament has done in that case. The question will be whether what Parliament has 
done is reasonable in all the circumstances…. In determining the appropriate level 
of scrutiny of Parliament’s duty to facilitate public involvement, the Court must 
balance, on the one hand, the need to respect parliamentary institutional autono-
my, and on the other, the right of the public to participate in public affairs. In my 
view, this balance is best struck by this Court considering whether what Parlia-
ment does in each case is reasonable. 
 
Did the NCOP and the provinces comply with the public involvement provisions? 
[154] ... There is no suggestion on the record that the NCOP held public 
hearings or invited written representations on any of the Bills. Insofar as the pro-
vincial legislatures are concerned, some but not all of the provinces held hearings 
in respect of some but not all of the Bills…. 
[163] Whether public hearings conducted by provincial legislatures are suf-
ficient to satisfy the obligation of the NCOP under section 72(1)(a) ultimately de-
pends on the facts and the nature of the process of facilitating public involvement 
that has occurred in the provinces, including the extent to which NCOP delega-
tions were involved in and have access to the information gathered during that 
process. 
 
[Traditional Health Practitioners Act] 
[181] On the record, six of nine provinces did not hold public hearings on 
this Bill nor did they invite written representations on it. In these circumstances, 
failure by the NCOP to hold public hearings on the THP Bill was unreasonable. In 
the result, I conclude that the NCOP did not comply with its obligation to facili-
tate public involvement in relation to the THP Bill as required by section 72(1)(a).  
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CTOP Amendment Act. 
[182] The CTOP Amendment Bill concerned the termination of pregnancy. 
This is not an uncontroversial matter. The Bill makes provision for registered 
nurses, other than midwives, to perform termination of pregnancies at certain pub-
lic and private facilities. As its preamble declares, its purpose is to “empower a 
Member of the Executive Council to approve facilities where a termination of 
pregnancy may take place; to exempt a facility offering a 24-hour maternity ser-
vice from having to obtain approval for termination of pregnancy services under 
certain circumstances”. There was great interest in this Bill as demonstrated by 
the requests for public hearings by interested groups. The NCOP responded to 
these requests by informing the interested groups that hearings would be held in 
the provinces. The NCOP itself considered that public hearings were desirable on 
the Bill. So too did the majority of provinces. 
[183] As reflected in the requests for public hearings received by the NCOP 
Chairperson, the CTOP Amendment Bill was of particular concern to the appli-
cant and other interested parties. These requests led to the NCOP’s decision that 
hearings on the Bill should be held at the provincial level. However, while it ap-
pears that four provinces – Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Northern 
Cape – wished to hold public hearings on the Bill, only Limpopo conducted a 
hearing…. 
[186] On the record, I am satisfied that of the provincial legislatures, only 
Limpopo and the Western Cape held public hearings or invited written submis-
sions in respect of the CTOP Amendment Bill. It is true that the applicant was 
permitted to make a submission to the KwaZulu-Natal legislature. However, the 
applicant contacted the Chairperson of the Health Committee on its own initia-
tive, and no other members of the public were invited or given an opportunity to 
make submissions. Moreover, it is clear that both the NCOP and a majority of the 
provinces considered that it was necessary to conduct public hearings, or at least 
invite written submissions, in relation to the CTOP Amendment Bill…. 
[188] Once it was conveyed to the NCOP that, contrary to its decision, a ma-
jority of the provinces did not hold public hearings, it was incumbent upon it to 
hold such hearings. The NCOP is not a rubber stamp of the provinces when it 
comes to the duty to facilitate public involvement. It is required by the Constitu-
tion to provide “a national forum for public consideration of issues affecting the 
provinces”. These considerations, in my judgment, lead to the conclusion that the 
NCOP and the provinces failed in their duty to facilitate public involvement in 
their legislative and other processes in relation to the CTOP Amendment Bill. 
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[189] In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the NCOP acted unreason-
ably in failing to hold public hearings on the CTOP Amendment Bill. In the 
event, the NCOP failed to comply with its obligation to facilitate public involve-
ment in relation to this Bill as required by section 72(1)(a)…. 
 
VII. Remedy. 
[198] I have found that the NCOP failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation 
comprehended in section 72(1)(a) in relation to the CTOP Amendment Bill and 
the THP Bill. Pursuant to section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, this Court is 
obliged to declare that the conduct of the NCOP in this regard is inconsistent with 
the Constitution and is therefore invalid. The respondents did not contend other-
wise. A declaration to that effect must accordingly be made. The question which 
was debated in the Court is whether the CTOP Amendment Act and the THP Act 
must as a consequence be declared invalid. Counsel for the respondents contend-
ed that this Court has no power to declare the resulting statute invalid. To do so, it 
was submitted, would infringe upon the doctrine of separation of powers…. 
[201] The provisions of section 172(1)(a) are clear, and they admit of no 
ambiguity; “[w]hen deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court … 
must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid”…. 
[202] As I see the question therefore, it is not whether we have the constitu-
tional authority to declare invalid these two statutes. The power to do so is there. 
The specific question presented in this case is whether the failure by the NCOP to 
comply with the provisions of section 72(1)(a) in relation to the CTOP Amend-
ment Act and the THP Act renders these statutes invalid. This case presents a 
unique question. It is not concerned with the substance of the legislation. It is 
concerned with the process by which the legislation was adopted. The answer to 
this question depends, among other things, upon the importance that the Constitu-
tion attaches to the requirement of public participation in the law-making process. 
[203] In the clearest and most unmistakeable language possible, the Pream-
ble to our Constitution declares the intention to establish “a democratic and open 
society in which government is based on the will of the people”. Consistent with 
this goal, the Constitution: (a) establishes as part of the founding values “a multi-
party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness 
and openness;” (b) embraces a democracy that has both representative and partic-
ipatory elements; and (c) makes provision for public involvement in the processes 
of the legislative organs of state. 
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[204] Thus in peremptory terms, section 72(1)(a) imposes an obligation on 
the NCOP to facilitate public participation in its legislative and other processes 
including those of its committees. And the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
requires that this “obligation [which is] imposed by [the Constitution] must be 
fulfilled”. Public involvement provisions therefore give effect to an important fea-
ture of democracy: its participative nature. The “participation of citizens in gov-
ernment … forms the basis and support of democracy, which cannot exist without 
it; for title to government rests with the people, the only body empowered to de-
cide its own immediate and future destiny and to designate its legitimate repre-
sentatives”. 
[205] Public participation in the law-making process is one of the means of 
ensuring that legislation is both informed and responsive. If legislation is infused 
with a degree of openness and participation, this will minimise dangers of arbi-
trariness and irrationality in the formulation of legislation. The objective in in-
volving the public in the law-making process is to ensure that the legislators are 
aware of the concerns of the public. And if legislators are aware of those con-
cerns, this will promote the legitimacy, and thus the acceptance, of the legislation. 
This not only improves the quality of the law-making process, but it also serves as 
an important principle that government should be open, accessible, accountable 
and responsive. And this enhances our democracy…. 
[207] Under our Constitution, therefore, the obligation to facilitate public in-
volvement is a requirement of the law-making process…. 
[211] In my judgment, this Court not only has a right but also has a duty to 
ensure that the law-making process prescribed by the Constitution is observed. 
And if the conditions for law-making processes have not been complied with, it 
has the duty to say so and declare the resulting statute invalid…. 
 
Yacoob J, dissenting. 
[247] This case raises fundamental and difficult issues. They concern the na-
ture of the democracy created by our Constitution, the respective constitutionally 
appropriate roles and powers of duly elected legislators and the public in general 
in the process of enacting a law, as well as the nature of the public involvement 
component and this Court’s role in relation to it…. 
 
The obligation to facilitate public involvement. 
[269] I must clarify the nature of the enquiry before us. We are concerned 
neither with the merits or demerits of participatory or representative democracies, 
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nor with what in our view would be the ideal balance between participation and 
representation in our democracy. This Court must determine what the Constitu-
tion requires. Equally this case has nothing to do with the views of the members 
of this Court in relation to whether public involvement is necessary in a democra-
cy, that public participation would lead to better legislation, that it would be un-
fair to pass legislation without public hearings or that it is desirable for the public 
to be given an opportunity to be consulted. I may have answered many of these 
questions in the affirmative but all we must decide is what our Constitution re-
quires in relation to public involvement. It is true that the Constitution must be in-
terpreted in relation to the international context but the words of the Constitution 
must not be lost sight of within that context…. 
[292] Citizens of this country cast their votes in favour of political parties 
represented in the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures. They have 
the right to become members of political parties, to campaign for them, to take 
part in their activities and to call them to account. It is these elected representa-
tives that govern the people and their representative activities are activities of the 
people. In passing legislation or in conducting any other activity, members of 
provincial legislatures and the National Assembly do not act on their own whims 
but represent the people of this country. To undermine these representatives is to 
undermine the political will of the people and to negate their choice at free and 
fair elections. Provincial representatives on the NCOP are mandated by the pro-
vincial legislatures in their capacities as representatives of the people. They are 
therefore mandated by the people in the same way as the President is elected by 
the people when the National Assembly elects him. Constitutionally speaking, it 
is the people of our country who, through their elected representatives, pass laws. 
[293] The Constitution deals extensively with voting, free and fair elections, 
multi - party democracy, a voters’ roll and the means by which decisions may be 
taken in Parliament. The provisions are detailed and specific. By contrast and 
leaving aside the provisions for public access, there are only two references to 
public involvement in relation to each of the National Assembly, the NCOP and 
the provincial legislatures. First, each of them is required to facilitate public in-
volvement in their legislative and other processes. Second, each of them must 
have “due regard” to “public involvement” when making their rules…. 
[308] What does public involvement mean? Perhaps it will be better to start 
by determining what the term cannot mean in our constitutional context. Public 
involvement cannot be equated to public participation. This is because the Consti-
tution uses the word participate in context which lend an interesting colour to the 
relative meaning of the words “involvement” and “participat (e) (ing) (ion)”…. 
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[309] The concept of participation is employed in the context of the legisla-
tive process in very interesting ways. First, the National Assembly and the NCOP 
participate in the legislative process. The Constitution requires that the rules and 
orders of the National Assembly, the NCOP and the provincial legislatures must 
provide for the participation in their proceedings and those of their committees of 
minority parties, and for the participation of provinces in the NCOP in a manner 
consistent with democracy. Furthermore, the role of the National Executive and 
local government representatives in the NCOP is described as participation even 
though none of them has any vote in the NCOP. 
[310] [C]itizens participate in the activities of political parties; elected repre-
sentatives, minority parties, and certain others participate in the processes of the 
National Assembly, the NCOP and the provincial legislatures; public involvement 
must be facilitated in the National Assembly, the NCOP and the provincial legis-
latures. Citizens have the right to participate in political parties. There is a duty to 
facilitate public involvement of all people including citizens in the legislative and 
other processes of the NCOP. Involvement must mean something less than partic-
ipation…. 
[312] It is impermissible to conclude that the term “public involvement” at 
the level of interpretation postulates as a minimum that the public must be given 
an opportunity to comment on draft legislation. The term is not capable of that 
construction. To interpret the phrase in this way would amount to re-drafting the 
Constitution…. 
[316] The process by which legislation is passed is crucial to a constitutional 
order. It must be clear, specific and sufficiently comprehensible to enable legisla-
tors to know exactly what steps they need to pass any legislation. Moreover, as I 
have said earlier, due regard to the value of the vote requires that acts of elected 
legislators be set aside only if the pre-requisites not complied with are stated in 
the clearest possible terms. It is therefore not surprising that the process in the 
Constitution is set out step by step in a defined way. In so far as it is concerned 
with legislation other than legislation amending the Constitution the process con-
tains no express provision to the effect that the public must be given any oppor-
tunity at all to comment or to be heard as a pre-requisite for the valid adoption of 
any law. The question is whether such a provision is implied. I have grave doubts 
as to whether it is permissible for courts to determine implied terms in relation to 
the process by which national legislation is to be passed but I will assume for the 
purposes of this judgment in favour of DFL that processes by which national leg-
islation is to be passed can be interpreted by the courts to include implied terms. I 
would say, however, that if this be the case it must be required that the only pos-
758 ATHANASIOS EFSTRATIOS PSYGKAS 
ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L’ HOMME 
VOL. V/2010 
sible inference that can be drawn from all the circumstances is that the term was 
necessarily implied and that the inference is so compelling that the reasonable 
legislator would doubtless have understood the implication. The question to be 
asked therefore is whether an additional step is necessarily implied and is so com-
pelling that it must be read into the national legislative process in so far as it does 
not concern constitutional amendments by reason of the provisions of section 
72(1)(a)…. 
[319] I therefore conclude that Parliament has to decide how public in-
volvement must be facilitated in the national legislative process and that Parlia-
ment is not obliged to ensure that reasonable steps to facilitate public involvement 
in that process are taken. It is by no means clear or necessarily implied that a pub-
lic opportunity to be heard or comment on legislation is a pre-condition to validity 
of legislation according to the Constitution. Nor in my view is it appropriate to 
expect of the reasonable member of Parliament to understand the relevant consti-
tutional provisions in this way. The effect of reading the relevant provisions in 
such a way that they oblige legislative bodies to give the public a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard or consulted before legislation is adopted for it to be valid 
constitutes a limitation on the power of elected representatives of the people to 
make law. That limitation is an impermissible intrusion and has a fundamental 
impact on the value of the right to vote acquired through bitter struggle. The ap-
proach undermines the right substantially…. 
[325] ... [I]t is Parliament that must first decide how participation in the na-
tional legislative process is to be facilitated. That decision would be reflected in 
the rules. If Parliament does not make any decision as it is obliged to do, it will 
have failed to fulfil an obligation imposed upon it by the Constitution. The NCOP 
and the National Assembly are both deliberative legislative bodies. All their deci-
sions are deliberative in nature. The only way in which any of these legislative 
bodies could make a decision that would add requirements that must be complied 
with for a valid national legislative process would be to make rules or to pass leg-
islation. There is no evidence in this case that Parliament has made any decision 
in connection with public involvement in the national legislative process. An ap-
propriate decision by Parliament is a pre-condition to review by this Court of the 
decision in relation to whether it constitutes fulfilment of the constitutional obli-
gation. 
 
International Law and Foreign Law. 
[328] ... The hard fact is ... that the provisions of the ICCPR are satisfied by 
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indirect participation reasonably restricted; DFL wants unrestricted indirect par-
ticipation as well as substantial direct participation. It is not necessary to go 
through any of the other international instruments. All of them are understandably 
satisfied with indirect participation without any direct component. 
[329] I have examined many constitutions. None of them properly read pro-
vide that legislation will be invalid unless some generally stated unspecific re-
quirement of public involvement is fulfilled. Many have manner and form provi-
sions that are clear and specific and that facilitate a measure of public involve-
ment. I have found no judgment of any court anywhere in which a legislative pro-
vision properly adopted in an open legislature and having been read through in the 
way required by the relevant instrument has been found to have been inconsistent 
with the constitution on the basis of non-compliance with some generalised public 
involvement provision even if the prescribed manner and form provisions have all 
been complied with…. 
 
Conclusion. 
[339] The Constitution does not require the section 72(1)(a) or section 
118(1)(a) public involvement provision to be complied with as a pre-requisite to 
any legislation being validly passed. To infer a requirement of this kind when it is 
not expressly provided for is to impermissibly undermine the legislature and the 
right to vote. In the circumstances, the fact that no opportunity was given for pub-
lic comment in the National Council of Provinces and in most of the provinces in 
the process of the passing of the Health Bills though regrettable is of no constitu-
tional moment in relation either to whether the National Council of Provinces or 
the provincial legislatures have complied with their constitutional obligations or 
to whether the Health Bills have been validly passed. In my view, the application 
accordingly falls to be dismissed. 
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